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	D STATES DISTRICT COURT	
	ERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
UNITEI	O STATES OF AMERICA,	
	v.	16 Cr. 644 (KBF)
JESUS	RODRIGUEZ JIMENEZ,	
	Defendant.	Sentence
		-x
		New York, N.Y. August 14, 2018 1:05 p.m.
Before	e:	
	HON. KATHER	RINE B. FORREST,
		District Judge
	APP	EARANCES
GEOFFREY S. BERMAN United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York NOAH FALK		
	Assistant United States	Attorney
LOUIS V. FASULO JEFFREY COHN		
GUADAI	LUPE VALENCIA Attorneys for Defendant	
	-	Crosial Agent DEA
ALSO PRESENT: DAVID BEHAR, Special MARK LANG, Special Ag		ecial Agent DEA
		RIOS, Interpreter (Spanish) , Interpreter (Spanish)

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1	(Case called)		
2	MR. FALK: Good afternoon. Noah Falk, for the		
3	government. With me at counsel table is Special Agent David		
4	Behar and Special Agent Mark Lang of the DEA.		
5	THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, folks.		
6	MR. FASULO: Good afternoon. Louis Fasulo, Fasulo		
7	Braverman & DiMaggio, along with my client, Mr. Rodriguez.		
8	MR. VALENCIA: Guadalupe Valencia, on behalf of		
9	Mr. Rodriguez.		
10	MR. COHN: Jeffrey Cohn, also on behalf of Mr.		
11	Rodriguez.		
12	MR. FASULO: Just for the record, also at the counsel		
13	table is my paralegal Icelsa Gonzalez.		
14	THE COURT: I recognize Ms. Gonzalez from several		
15	proceedings.		
16	Mr. Valencia, have you filed a notice of appearance?		
17	You have?		
18	MR. VALENCIA: Yes, your Honor. I appeared at the		
19	first hearing, and I filed a notice back then.		
20	THE COURT: Terrific.		
21	MR. VALENCIA: Thank you, your Honor.		
22	THE COURT: The Court notes that Mr. Rodriguez is here		
23	and present.		
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Rodriguez-Jimenez, and I want to make sure that I state a

We're here today for the sentencing of Mr. Jesus

couple of things on the record which indicates why we are here in August of 2018 for a plea that occurred back in September of 2017.

Mr. Fasulo.

MR. FASULO: I'm sorry, Judge. I just want to put on the record the interpreter part. We have the interpreter and Mr. Rodriguez can hear.

THE COURT: Sure. Yes, there is a Spanish interpreter for Mr. Rodriguez. I see that you're wearing the equipment, sir. Can you hear the translation?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. If at any point in time you can't hear the translation or if you don't understand something that's being said, just make a motion or indicate it to one of your attorneys or make a motion to me, and we'll get that fixed immediately. All right?

THE DEFENDANT: OK.

MR. FASULO: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I wanted to set forth for the record why we are in a sort of an unusual position where the plea occurred quite a long time ago, but we're sentencing Mr. Rodriguez only right now. The reason for that is there had been a period of time that extended, as I understand it, until late into the spring when there had been a series of proffers by

Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez looking towards the possibility of a cooperation agreement. That did not result in a cooperation agreement. All of that, the back and forth on the proffers, is set forth in the filings, and so I wanted to just indicate that that really took up a substantial chunk of time.

As a result, Mr. Jesus Rodriguez-Jimenez has been in custody for almost two years at this point, since 2016. The PSR actually has the exact timing, so I don't want to, yes, get it wrong. He was arrested in Nevada on July 1, 2016, and then transferred to federal custody in the Southern District on July 27, 2016. So it has been actually a little over two years.

The way that I typically start these proceedings is to set forth for the record the counts of conviction and then also the materials that I've received and make sure that I've got what you folks think I should have.

Mr. Cohn.

MR. COHN: Yes, your Honor. Just in conjunction with what your Honor said about the timing and to complete the record as regards to the timing of today's proceeding, the sentencing, we put in a request for an adjournment on, I believe, July 30, a day or two — or maybe it was the 29th, a day or two before our submission was due, our initial submission. The reason for that request was that pursuant and as a result of these proffers that your Honor referred to,

there was some evidence or materials generated which we sought to have an expanded period of time to evaluate. There were reams, many pages of documents Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez provided to the government and the recordings of consensual conversations that he made under the supervision of the DEA. It was our intention and contention that these materials were relevant to basically proving the value of the assistance he was providing, despite some earlier misstarts in his cooperation. Your Honor denied that request without explanation.

And just to complete the record, because it has now ripened into, as your Honor can see in the filings, a bone of contention about the value of that, we'd like your Honor to put on the record the reason for the denial of that when we only received those materials the day that we filed the request.

THE COURT: Yes, I have no problem stating why it is important to sentence an individual in a timely way. I think that the sentencing here has gone on -- Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez pled guilty almost a year ago, and not sentencing him now gravely concerns the Court. In fact, sentencing him in August gravely concerns the Court. I wish I had sentenced him as soon as the proffer sessions had ended, but the PSR process takes some time.

I am not ever particularly concerned with why the government chooses or does not choose to engage in a

cooperation agreement. That's a prosecutorial decision that they are entitled to make; and, therefore, the government is fully entitled to have made a determination that, in its view, the information was not reliable. That's a unilateral decision which it's entitled to make. Frankly, the basis for my decision on sentencing relates to the conduct of conviction and not to the various matters that were or were not raised during the proffers in terms of the materials that were at issue in your letter.

Therefore, investigation, further investigation into those materials is really an irrelevancy in terms of this Court's ultimate sentencing determination, and a delay and an adjournment would therefore not have been something which was in the interests of justice. However, we'll go through a couple of things to just make sure that there is no need for a Fatico. I'll be clear that I don't believe there is because I think that where I see the points of dispute are things upon which I need not rely in order to reach a sentencing determination and do not intend to rely. But if something comes up that you believe, Mr. Cohn, does require a Fatico, you should make sure that we state it. But, again, it is not a sentencing issue for the Court that the government has unilaterally chosen not to engage in a cooperation agreement. That's just their prerogative.

MR. COHN: Thank you, your Honor.

Just to complete the record on that, our position is that the materials that we were pressed in time to evaluate were relevant under Section 3553(a) factors. I believe there have been appellate decisions in which the higher courts have said, in substance, a failed cooperation, to paraphrase, can be used as a 3553(a) factor, and these materials that we sought time to review, we believe, would have been materials that we could have used had we had the time requested to make more full arguments on 3553(a).

THE COURT: Let me then assuage your concern this way, which is I accept fully and I do take it into consideration and have taken it into consideration that the defendant was proffering actively and met with the government on a number of occasions. I accept that. I take that into consideration. I think that it is important to note, for the record, that the Court has considered that as a mitigating factor in terms of the overall conduct.

So do not concern yourself that the Court somehow undervalues or devalues his cooperation. The fact, however, remains that he did not ultimately end up in a position where he has a 5K agreement or a cooperation agreement with the government that resulted in a 5K letter. That is, again, something to the unilateral discretion of the prosecution. So it is not a matter of any inability to raise a 3553(a) factor. There are a number of areas already set forth in the defense

submission as to areas of proffer with which the government hasn't taken issue. There are, however, a couple of points of dispute. Primarily the one that I want to explore is the time frame of the unlawful conduct. That, I think, actually comes out through the PSR because the PSR itself has the time frame in it, and so that may resolve any issues. But the fact of potential proffering and of a number of areas that may have otherwise been useful to the government in some ways, but ultimately, the inability or decision by the government not to give cooperation, I think, is in their discretion.

So it's not that I'm not taking it into consideration and giving the defendant credit for it. I certainly am.

That's why, and the only reason why, I would allow a sentencing to have gone on and have taken this long. In fact, my normal practice, of course, is to sentence defendants almost immediately after receiving the PSR and getting the information. I would almost never have allowed a sentencing to have gone on this long. The reason for it was because we actively ensured that we were monitoring that there were ongoing proffers. So for those reasons, I am confident that we are able to proceed today without issue.

I also will note that I have a familiarity with this record and familiarity with this overall matter. As you folks know, I sentenced Mr. Urbina. I also was the judge who presided over the deferred prosecution agreement. We've had a

number of proceedings. So it is useful for me to now complete the process, given my particular information on this. So let's go and go through the various things that I would like to do right now which relate to the counts of conviction and what I've received.

Count One, the defendant pled guilty to two counts, to Count One, which carries a ten-year maximum sentence, and Count Three, which carries a 20-year maximum sentence. Count One is a conspiracy to engage in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, and Count Three is concealment money laundering.

Now, there are several submissions that I've received in connection with this proceeding: A defense submission dated July 31, 2018, attached to which are a number of letters.

Actually, altogether, between that and the August 8, 2018, submission are several dozen letters. There's also a sealed submission dated August 12, 2018. The government then made a submission dated August 7, 2018, and a second submission responding to the August 12 submission from the defense. That second government submission is August 13, 2018. The Court is working with the presentence investigation report that is dated May 7, 2018. That is a revised report based upon the objections that had been received to date.

Let's start with whether there are other materials that I should be looking at that you folks believe you have

submitted in connection with this proceeding at this point.

Mr. Falk?

MR. FALK: That's all from us, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Cohn?

MR. COHN: Nothing else from the defense, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then let's go through the PSR and determine whether there are any objections to the factual statements in the PSR.

As you folks understand, the Court does not adopt a sentencing recommendation from probation. That's not part of what the Court adopts and incorporates by reference. The Court right now is focused on the factual statements in the PSR and whether there are objections to or modifications that you folks believe need to be made to the PSR. The Court reviews a sentencing recommendation from probation, but ultimately the Court is required to and does make its own independent sentencing recommendation — sentencing decision for every defendant based upon a review of a variety of things, including sentencing recommendations from counsel as well as probation.

Mr. Falk, are there any objections to or modifications that you believe need to be made to the PSR?

MR. FALK: Not from the government.

THE COURT: All right. Then let me ask Mr. Cohn, have you reviewed the PSR with your client?

MR. COHN: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do either you or your client have any objections to or modifications to be made to the PSR?

MR. COHN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Was the PSR translated for your client?

MR. COHN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court then does adopt the factual statements set forth in the PSR. The PSR will be made part of the record and filed under seal. If an appeal is taken, then counsel on any appeal may have access to the PSR without any need for further application to the Court.

Now, let's talk about the one issue that I think is something that I want to make sure that I am able to reference in my sentencing determination, which is what I think is important to take away in terms of the time frame of the defendant's conduct. I do understand that during the proffer session there was one time frame that was referenced and that the government takes issue with the more recent statements in the defense submission about a different time frame. And we'll get to the guidelines in a moment, by the way, I haven't forgotten about those.

It is my view that what's important are two things which don't require me to land on a particular date.

Therefore, I don't believe that it's necessary for me to determine whether or not it's 2011 or 2015. Those two things are the following: (1) That the defendant as part of his plea

agreement agreed to forfeit the proceeds traceable to the offenses of conviction in the amount of \$284 million. That amount is suggestive of a particular ongoing set of criminal conduct. I am content to have it be a couple of years. That to me is sufficient. I don't need to necessarily get down to the nitty-gritty of whether it was a six-year period or a five-year period. The \$284 million gives me an array, an indication as to the magnitude of the conduct. The date is simply a proxy for magnitude; and, therefore, I don't think that we should tarry on the date.

I also would note that there are indications in the PSR that the conduct was at least as of, in terms of the overall conspiracy, 2013. I would look at paragraphs 19 et seq. for that information, though a variety of the more specific conduct, which I'm focused on for Mr. Jesus Rodriguez-Jimenez, is 2014/2015. That's really what I was focused on. Otherwise, while there is more detail in terms of the government submission and the defense submission, my takeaway is not to get into the nuances of those submissions, apart from really focusing on what's in the PSR.

Let me ask, Mr. Falk, does the government have any issue with the Court proceeding in that manner?

MR. FALK: We don't, your Honor. I think that that approach makes a lot of sense, and the government agrees that, really, the key number here is the forfeiture number of

\$284 million which, in the government's view, reflects a long-running scheme regardless of whether it began in 2011 or 2013.

THE COURT: Let me ask, then, defense counsel, do you have any problem with me proceeding in that manner?

MR. COHN: Not only do we not have any problem, but as I will make clear in our sentencing remarks, nothing in our submissions was meant to dispute the admissions that Mr. Rodriguez made in the proffers, and I'll expand upon that later.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. COHN: Not only do we not have a problem, in essence, with the time frame in the beginning, we're in agreement with the government.

THE COURT: So I can lose the 2011 date, it sounds like.

MR. COHN: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. That eliminates that. I don't view the other particular factual matters where there are disputes between the submissions as important or underlying the Court's sentencing determination in any way. I really am focused on those matters as to which the PSR has the factual statements, and we'll hear what Mr. Cohn has to say during his sentencing remarks for further details where there may be no points of dispute.

Then the guidelines. I don't think we should also spend any time really on the guidelines. There were guidelines set forth at the time of the plea that were in excess, effectively, of the statutory maximum. That under the guidelines brings it down to, pursuant to the guidelines, the statutory maximum of 360 months. Therefore, while there are a number of ways in which we could slice and dice certain enhancements or not and we could talk about whether there was, in the government's view, a need for withdrawal of acceptance of responsibility or obstruction of justice, I don't think we have to get to any of that because the way in which the guidelines were calculated as part of the plea agreement put us at the same point as probation.

The Court is content with what probation has done, which essentially brings it down to 360 months, because the guidelines otherwise would be at a level that exceeds the statutory maximum. So I don't think that there's any need to go into the disputes that the parties might otherwise have with particular pieces of a guidelines calculation that otherwise could be done. In other words, in short, the Court is content to adopt the guidelines calculation as set forth in the plea agreement.

Any dispute with that, Mr. Falk?

MR. FALK: No. That works for us, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Cohn, any dispute with that?

MR. COHN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court, then, does confirm the guideline calculation as 360 months, which is the statutory maximum sentence. I therefore eliminate any disputes relating to the guidelines that might otherwise be brought forward on any appeal.

Let's go ahead and turn our attention to really what is the main point of getting beyond those first preliminary matters, which is to talk to folks about what you would like to have my attention be focused on here today. The way I start is with the government; then defense counsel; then if the government needs to comment, they can comment; and then ultimately the defendant, if he would like to address the Court, gets the last word in my courtroom.

Let's start, then, Mr. Falk, with you.

MR. FALK: Thank you, your Honor.

The government wants to bring to the Court's attention just the incredible seriousness of the conduct at issue here. In the government's view, this scheme, which was long running whether the Court credits the defendant's view that it began in 2015 or the government's view that it began in 2011, whatever the case, it was --

THE COURT: They're now agreeing with you that it can be 2011. I think that Mr. Cohn has eliminated that as a basis for a factual dispute.

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MR. FALK: Well, I will take that.

But in any event, it's just incredibly serious conduct. We're talking about essentially the defendant was the CEO of a shadow banking network that facilitated the distribution of massive amounts of narcotics, among other criminal activity, in over three continents. And he leveraged a web of shell corporations, couriers, and other seemingly legitimate businesses and devices in order to facilitate essentially a banking network for narcotics traffickers. It. allowed their activity to occur on a massive scale, and I don't think anybody in the courtroom would dispute the indelible harm that that level of narcotics trafficking causes to communities, both here in the United States, in Mexico, in Europe, and throughout the continents that were touched by the defendant's conduct. All told, the defendant acknowledged that his laundering network facilitated the laundering of over \$300 million in narcotics and other criminal proceeds.

So, really, that conduct, that is what I would like to focus the Court on. It seems to me that the statements that were made in the defendant's sentencing submission indicating that he thought that it was OK to engage in this kind of conduct because he never touched drugs, he just touched the money, those minimizations should not be credited by the Court. The government has had a lot of opportunity to debrief the defendant. We've heard a lot from him, and as we have laid out

in our submissions to the Court, it's clear to us that the defendant is incapable of consistent honesty, is incapable of understanding the scope of the damage that this enterprise has caused, and that a significant sentence is warranted in light of the severity of the conduct.

If the Court has any questions for me, I'm happy to respond; otherwise, I will rest on the submissions.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I think right now I do not have any additional questions. Let's just hear from Mr. Cohn.

MR. COHN: Yes, your Honor. First, to address what Mr. Falk said, I think right there you can see one of the problems that we've been experiencing. In the run-up to our remarks right now, I conceded that the conduct started in 2011 because my client conceded that, and that's in fact what happened. Mr. Falk just stood up and again tried to say that we were perpetrating, in essence, in practicality, an untruth by saying it was 2015/2016. It's that kind of lack of intellectual rigor which I think has caused a lot of disputes in this case.

First of all, to address the government's letter of 2013, of August 13, yesterday, that's where a lot of that comes from. It misapprehended our August 12 submission. I never said that the conduct was one to two years. What I said was that, in the government's August 7 submission and in fact in

the PSR, they were talking about a long-running conspiracy without going into the facts underlying those adjectives. That is a fault in the logic of a submission, not a dispute of the facts of the submission. I was not saying it was a one- to two-year conspiracy. In fact, my actual wording in my submission was it was a confused narrative that apparently relied on it. And I invite the Court and Mr. Falk to point out to me in their August 7 submission whether they went into anything before 2015.

So the point was not that this was a one- or two-year conspiracy. Obviously, our client admitted it started in 2011, and he should be credited with that. The point was in their August 7 submission, they kept saying long running, long running, but when it came time to talk about dates, they only talked about 2015 to 2016. And I think that is a hallmark of the submission.

The other thing that Mr. Falk said again in his remarks and talked about in yesterday's submission was somehow that there was a dishonesty by Jesus in saying that his rationale for getting into this was that he was never touching the drugs. Well, there is no drug dealing or involvement in drug dealing by Jesus between 2011 and 2014 directly. He did admit on two occasions, after being in business with these drug dealers for three years, that he did allow his trucks and made money from moving drugs on two occasions, but in the context of

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a six-year -- five-year, actually, group of activity, to say that I got into it initially by deceiving myself that I was not involved with drugs, that doesn't make him a liar that three years later he did drug deals which he candidly admitted he did for money.

Getting back to what I know is your Honor's main point, the conduct and the appropriate sentence, the conduct in the PSR, the PSR does not mention Jesus until, I think, about ten or 15 paragraphs into the conduct, the offense conduct in this case. And when it does mention him, it only mentions him in relation to nonviolent money transactions because, really, your Honor, that's as much as the conduct, which I know your Honor wants to focus on, who no one disputes is very serious, it is very serious conduct, but what we're really talking about here is what does that conduct mean as far as what sentence is necessary and not greater than necessary? If you really analyze that part of 3553(a), there needs to be some, in a court, evidentiary support for the sentence that the government is asking for, some anecdotal evidence, some social science evidence. Why is this sentence, which is an extremely heavy sentence for a first-time, nonviolent offender, why is that necessary? Is there any reason to believe, based on everything we all know about the way the criminal justice system works, that long sentences equate to deterrence specifically, deterrence generally? There's nothing. There's really nothing

that we can point to that says that this amount of time, or anything close to it, is necessary, which is the mandate of 3553(a).

Now, the PSR, which I know your Honor wants to focus on, has in accord with our submissions the facts that this is a man who will be 48 years old tomorrow. The letters, your Honor, describe the same fact pattern time after time. He helps people get education. He takes care of children for whom he has no moral responsibility. This is the person that you're sentencing, your Honor.

I know the conduct is serious. I'm going to repeat it as much as I have to because we don't deny that, but that's not the only thing. I submit to you there is a host of other factors where, even if they're not equal in importance, are very important under the framework of 3553(a): nonviolent first-time offender; a man who's filled his life, according to the dozens of letters, with good deeds. We had 27 or 23 items of assistance which the government itself characterized in its letter yesterday as significant, that they didn't dispute.

By the way, your Honor, some of those documents that we sought to amplify in our review, those were documents that, whether or not the government trusts Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez, those documents prove beyond a shadow of a doubt what he was saying as regards various criminality. I'm not going to go over the point-by-point recitation, but as your Honor noted at

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the top, and I'm sure your Honor read the submission, it's substantial and, as the government put it, significant information. Most, perhaps, important as regards the defendant's intention — and we tried to lean on this in our letter and I would like to repeat it at the risk of being repetitive today — is the defendant's offer to turn in his own younger brother who by your Honor's, I'm sure, thorough analysis of the PSR was the main drug mover in this case and remains a fugitive.

It's a really strange thing to me that, as I said at the top, in a scheme where we require evidence to make our conclusions in courts, that there is traditionally and in this case specifically no evidence about, again, anecdotally or in a social science sense, why a certain time is sufficient rather than greater than necessary. I know it's not susceptible to a precise analysis. Every case is different. Every person's different. It's difficult to say. But certainly, if I were sitting where your Honor were sitting, if I was being asked to impose this amount of time on a first-time nonviolent offender, a man who stands before this Court with no mandatory minimum, with acknowledgment of his criminal activity, there should be something you can point to and say, Look, if I give him this sentence, this will be the result. Other than our own personalities which we bring to bear on that question, there really is nothing.

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So when we analyze the undisputed facts, without again disputing the seriousness of the conduct, the sentence that the government's asking for is just patently ridiculous. sentence should be reserved for only the most violent people, only the people directly convicted of narcotics offenses at the highest level. And even then, if they were nonviolent, I would submit that there would be a problem for that kind of sentence for a first-time 48-year-old man when your Honor, I know, takes into account the significant, in the government's words, information that the defendant provided; the fact that there are all these dozens of letters attesting to his character; the fact that he has the intelligence to be rehabilitated which, after all, is another one of the factors of 3553(a). We submit to you that a sentence far, far below, one in the range that we advocated in our submission, is the appropriate sentence to conform to 3553(a)'s requirement of sufficient but not greater than necessary.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez, would you like to address the Court before sentence is imposed?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes, you can certainly turn that microphone towards you. Thank you, sir.

MR. VALENCIA: Your Honor, do you want Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez to stand?

THE COURT: Whatever you're most comfortable doing.

Sometimes people are. It's nice if you stand, but if it's more comfortable to sit, I will take no offense.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, initially, I would like to say that I know that nothing I say here is going to change the decision that your Honor decide to make.

THE COURT: Well, let me just also say that I always listen to what the defendant has to say prior to making an ultimate sentencing determination. That is part of what I take into consideration as a totality of facts and considerations in my determination.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

I would like to express to you that I am very aware of the wrongdoing I have committed. I have been able to see how far-reaching these crimes have gone. And I would just like to say that if you allow me to reintegrate myself into society and work for myself and my family, I will not commit any other criminal acts. And I'd just like to say that I have the desire and the strength to reintegrate myself into society and to achieve the goals that I had before getting into this trouble. That is it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. Mr. Falk, you're looking at me

expectantly. Is there something else? Normally, I just have the defendant say the last word and have you comment before that. Is there something you feel you wanted to say?

MR. FALK: I understand, your Honor. I would just like to respond very briefly to some of the items that Mr. Cohn raised if you'll permit me.

With respect to his assertions that Mr. Rodriguez is completely nonviolent, I think that that's belied by the description of the conduct that's contained in our letter with respect to his codefendant Sergio Urbina. Whether or not that was specifically violent behavior, the occurrence that happened with respect to Mr. Urbina was certainly backed by the threat of violence, and I think it's only a matter of luck that Mr. Urbina was able to escape that situation intact, given that he was essentially kidnapped by the defendant.

THE COURT: Let me just say this so that it is absolutely clear that there is no factual dispute that is meaningful to the Court's imposition of a sentence so that we don't need a Fatico hearing on this issue. It is not important to the Court's decision that there has been any violence. I am willing to accept and I do accept for purposes of the sentencing proceeding that Mr. Jesus Rodriguez-Jimenez is a nonviolent individual. I understand the government's point that they believe they have information on it; however, that would be disputed by the defense and therefore could create a

factual issue.

I don't think there's any reason for me to need to go there. What I am really focused on is the money laundering, both the concealment and the transaction, both Counts One and Counts Two -- sorry, Counts One and Counts Three, there are two counts, not on that conduct. So I appreciate your reference to it. I should tell you that I am going to ignore that situation.

MR. FALK: Thank you, your Honor.

With respect to another reason why a significant sentence is warranted here, the defendant says if he gets out, he will be reintegrated into society. Let me just say that the government is aware that the defendant's money laundering operation and network is still intact to a certain extent, and from our perspective, what an insignificant sentence would mean is that the defendant would be back doing the very same thing that got him here in the first place in very short order. So that is another reason that we feel that a significant sentence is warranted in this case.

Finally, with respect to the significant information provided by the defendant, we agree that he provided voluminous information. However, the usefulness of that information, as pointed out in our sentencing submission, is dubious at best given its source. That includes documents that were provided by the defendant.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. FALK: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let me again, I just want to repeat one thing, which is I am not concerned here today with the reasons why the government chose not to give the defendant a cooperation agreement. The government always has the unilateral ability in its own prosecutorial discretion to choose with whom it wants to engage in a back-and-forth and cooperative endeavor, and the government here chose that it was not going to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.

I also accept, however, I just want to repeat this, that the defendant did, in fact, proffer on a number of occasions. I also accept that there was a variety of information that, had the government wanted to pursue a cooperation agreement, could have been useful and may still have been useful. That's part of what a proffer does. It sometimes presents the government with useful information which does not result in a cooperation agreement. That's one of the ways in which that process works. There are no guarantees as part of the back-and-forth proffering.

Just to make it absolutely clear, the Court's sentencing determination does not take into consideration or depend upon the reliability, or lack of reliability, in terms of what the government has proffered. I will accept what the defense has said in terms of there was substantial information

provided to the government. That doesn't change the fact that the government did not choose to give a cooperation agreement. That, in the Court's view, eliminates any issue with regard to the timing of this proceeding and whether or not there's any need to delve into reliability or lack of reliability or things of that nature.

All right. Mr. Cohn.

MR. COHN: Your Honor covered 90 percent of what I wanted to respond to, but the other 10 percent is Mr. Falk says that there's criminal activity that is going on out there, and he believes that means the defendant would rejoin that activity. There's no evidence to support that.

THE COURT: All right. Let me, then, go to what my sentencing determination, the basis for it is. Certainly, I am a very committed believer to the Court always setting forth its sentencing determination and its rationale, and I've done that, I hope, in every sentencing proceeding and will do it here.

The Court is required to take into consideration the sentencing guidelines. That's one of the things that a judge is always required to take into consideration. I am not bound by the guidelines here in terms of being required to impose a particular sentence. The guidelines are advisory only. In this particular situation, neither Count One nor Count Three, the two counts of conviction, neither count carries any kind of mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, I have discretion to

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determine what the appropriate sentence is.

With that said, the Court does look at the guidelines as presenting a potentially reasonable sentence. It is up to me then, in applying the various sentencing factors under 3553(a), to determine whether, in fact, the guidelines for the circumstances here and the defendant's own history and characteristics here merit such a sentence. But I will say that, in general, I am of the view and have been of the view since 2011 that the guidelines are, in fact, a useful tool for the Court. While I understand there is a great deal of debate about the quidelines, I am of the view that they assist the Court and courts across the country in reducing sentencing disparities. That does not mean that I or anybody else should accept the guidelines as necessarily setting forth what is appropriate for a particular defendant for a particular set of circumstances, but it is indicative of my view that they are useful.

With that said, ultimately, what I have to do is focus on language that Mr. Cohn referenced, which is what kind of sentence would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, for a particular defendant for a particular crime.

There are a variety of factors that the Court has to analyze in making that determination. The federal sentencing 3553(a) factors guide the Court. I have to look at the nature and the circumstances of the offense. How serious was the

offense? What was the offense doing to our community or communities, whether it's a community writ large in terms of the country, in terms of certain specific communities? What was happening? Why was the defendant engaged in that offense in terms of the offense itself? That goes to his history and characteristics. What do I know about him in terms of why he did it and whether or not there's any likelihood that he would do it again, and whether I think there needs to be a portion of the sentence or an entirety of the sentence that will speak to something that we call personal deterrence. It can also be taken as incapacitation under certain circumstances.

Deterrence, personal deterrence, can be short term or it can be longer term, depending upon one's judgment of character.

In addition to that, one looks at issues such as general deterrence. Does a particular sentence indicate to others that might be inclined to engage in such conduct that this particular conduct will be treated with a particular level of seriousness, which will assist us as a society in generally deterring the conduct here or similar conduct that would be like it?

I also have to look at what is a just sentence, what type of sentence will promote respect for the law; whether there are any educational, medical, correctional, or vocational treatment indicated by a particular sentence. And ultimately, again, we're always coming back to what is a sufficient, but

not greater than necessary, sentence.

I also in this kind of case take into consideration whether other sentences for other codefendants are somehow indicative of what a sentence that would be just here would be. I would note that Mr. Urbina who was referenced in the defense submission stands in a very different set of circumstances from this defendant, both in terms of his level of involvement and his position in the overall organization, and then the fact that Mr. Urbina pled guilty pursuant to and was sentenced pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Mr. Urbina did not have a set of circumstances that is similar to this defendant, so he was given a particular sentence that reflected his characteristics as a person, as well as the nature and the circumstances of his involvement in the offense.

Let me then go back to what we have here in terms of my analysis of these factors. This was an incredibly serious two offenses. They're separate crimes of conviction. The law treats each crime of conviction separately. They carry separate penalties, and they have separate indications as to the type of criminal conduct that is being addressed by each of them.

Here, we have an individual, Mr. Jesus

Rodriguez-Jimenez, who was a major money launderer for

narcotics traffickers, to the tune that we know of, of

\$284 million. That's \$284 million of money laundering that at

least in part, and in significant part, was associated with narcotics trafficking. There may have been other forms of unlawful activity, but certainly narcotics trafficking was a very significant part of that.

We know that narcotics—trafficking organizations, to focus on that aspect of it, require in order for them to succeed that there be ways in which the funds, the money that is obtained from narcotics trafficking, can be laundered so that the narcotics traffickers can then utilize those funds with lessened risk. That is part of what makes the machinery of narcotics trafficking go around. We know that narcotics traffickers do not engage in narcotics trafficking just for the fun of it. They engage in it as a business. These are large—scale traffickers, and that part of the business requires a banking operation, and Mr. Rodriguez—Jimenez was a banking operation for a large—scale set of narcotics trafficking that is laid out in the PSR.

The conduct here, the seriousness of the conduct, is underscored not only by the very, very significant dollar amount that is associated with it but also with how brazen the conduct was. What is set forth in the PSR is really conduct which is breathtaking in how brazen it was.

Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez kept records of his conduct, detailed, detailed records of the money flow and of the way in which his organization was running funds. And it was

complicated. It was done through a variety of fronts that were assisting with this, and it is a level, magnitude of money laundering and conspiracy to engage in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, both of those crimes, that is incredibly serious and needs to be treated with a level of seriousness commensurate with that from the Court.

I do note and have kept in mind and have given a great deal of consideration to the number of proffer sessions that the defendant had with the government. That is always of significance to the Court and is so here. There are, however, a number of reasons why the government may or may not choose, ultimately, to sign a defendant up as a cooperator. What is important to me is that, ultimately, this defendant is not being signed up as a cooperator. He is being sentenced today for his conduct, and it is up to me to determine whether or not, assuming that he was being truthful in his cooperation, whether or not that cooperation would indicate a particular sentence that is of such a low level as requested by the defense or something else.

It is worth, then, pausing on the reasons why individuals and, in particular, I believe,

Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez, the characteristics displayed overall in the PSR, why it does not necessarily indicate to me a dramatic change of heart. I also should say against this I'm mindful of all of the letters of support for Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez.

Cooperation agreements are often a reasonable desired outcome for a defendant looking at what is otherwise an incredibly serious sentence. It can often be a very rational decision to try to cooperate with the government to get a sentencing reduction. It does not mean, as a defense attorney who tried several cases in front of me used to say on cross-examination, that proffering with the government and giving information to the government is a car wash for the soul. It doesn't necessarily mean, in other words, that a defendant by proffering, even proffering truthful information, which I accept here occurred, it does not mean that the defendant does not remain an individual who would revert to criminal behavior if given the opportunity.

What it does indicate is that there are very few tools in the toolbox to obtain a lower sentence. That is one of them. Often it works; sometimes it doesn't work. It didn't work here. In other words, cooperation, a cooperation agreement, was not obtained here. The government certainly engages in cooperation agreements with sufficient frequency that the Court does not take the lack of a cooperation agreement here as some sort of irrational move by the government. The government, then again, just exercised its unilateral prosecutorial discretion.

So from my perspective, I can assume that the defendant proffered, that he cooperated, that he gave truthful

information, but I can still believe that that does not change my overall analysis that he would nonetheless, given the scale, the magnitude of the operation, the sophistication with which the operation was run, the level of detail, the level of organization that he had, it does not indicate to me that he necessarily is suddenly going to change his ways.

My sentence, and as I think about also the history and characteristics of Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez, my sentence needs to account for what I believe, therefore, is a very significant need for this sentence to indicate to Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez that this kind of conduct is over, that his participation in this criminal organization is at an end, that it's at a long-term end, that it should not and will not go on, that will have, at least one would hope, a significant impact on the organization, given the level of Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez.

Of course, there are always often others who will try to fill the void, but it does appear that Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez had particular skills in his organizational abilities and his abilities to run large-scale organizations that will mean that when he is taken off the streets, as he has been, that there will be an impact. Therefore, the personal deterrent aspects of the sentence are of some significance.

The Court also believes that, given the magnitude of the sentence, given the magnitude of the sentence, there will also be a general deterrent aspect to it. In other words, that

the conduct here was of a nature that needs to be treated with great seriousness. And others who might be likely to engage in such conduct or may be engaging in it now, indeed may be fulfilling Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez's role today for him, in place of him in a similar organization or even the same organization, will understand that this kind of crime will carry a very, very serious sentence. So there is a way in which this sentence will carry a general deterrent purpose as well.

I should say that, given the way in which this organization was run, it is essential for the Court to send a very serious message, and I would expect that word would get out. In other words, I would expect that the wide-sweeping individuals who may continue to be involved in this kind of organization, the broad group of individuals, will learn of this sentence and will hear of it; and, therefore, that the general deterrent purpose that the Court intends to be filled, in part by this sentence, will, in fact, occur.

So I do think of this sentence as having a personal deterrent aspect, a general deterrent aspect of recognizing the seriousness of the offense and of doing justice to the crime which occurred here, and that is, the crime is not only the crimes of conviction but ultimately having an impact on narcotics traffickers who will understand that at least a portion of their organization that they rely upon generally, if it is found and recognized and able to be prosecuted, will be

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dealt with with the utmost seriousness.

Accordingly, under all of the factors of 3553(a), taking into consideration the offenses of conviction, which again I take as two separate offenses, and also recognizing the history and the characteristics of this particular individual before me, having read all of his letters and having recognized his attempts at proffering with the government, it is my very carefully considered judgment that a sentence at the statutory maximum for each of the two counts of conviction is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, here. That is, Count One carries a maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment. That's 120 months. Count Three carries a separate 20-year sentence, that is 240 months. It is my intent to pronounce a sentence for those two counts of conviction, and the sentences imposed will run consecutive to one another. That is 120 months on Count One and 240 months on Count Three. That is for a total of 360 months, or 30 years' imprisonment.

I am not going to impose a separate period of supervised release because the defendant will be deported. Therefore, supervised release, from the Court's perspective, ultimately is unnecessary.

I do, however, impose a \$200 mandatory special assessment. There is also a consent order of forfeiture in the amount of \$284 million, and the Court does order forfeiture in the amount and on the terms that have been consented to. I

have signed the order of forfeiture.

The Court is not going to impose restitution. There's no separate restitution being sought.

I'm not going to impose a separate fine. I do acknowledge that probation had sought a separate fine. However, the Court does not view the fine as particularly useful here given the magnitude of the forfeiture order.

Let me just say that the possibility of this duration of a sentence was specifically discussed at the plea. I took the plea myself, and I review and always review very carefully during the plea, during pleas, what this could mean. That there would, for instance, be the possibility of this kind of sentence being imposed.

Indeed, when reviewing the appeal rights that are waived, the Court always pauses in particular, I always personally pause in particular on what is being waived. Here, there was a waiver of any appeal or seeking a sentence modification of any sentence that is up to and including the 360-month sentence that I have imposed. Accordingly, I just want there to be an acknowledgment on the record that the plea transcript should also be reviewed in connection, as of course it would be, if there's any appeal taken.

Is there any legal or other reason why sentence should not be imposed as stated, Mr. Falk?

MR. FALK: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Cohn?

MR. COHN: Apart from what's already been said in the record, no, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The Court does impose sentence as stated.

Now, having imposed the sentence, I will say that there are also -- I believe there's an open count, Mr. Falk.

MR. FALK: Yes, your Honor. We would move to dismiss that count.

THE COURT: That count is dismissed, the open count.

I think it's only one count. Count Two is dismissed. Any open counts are hereby dismissed.

Now, you have a right to appeal,

Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez. You've waived a number of appeal rights in connection with your plea, but it's not my place to tell you whether you have any bases for appeal. It will be up to you to determine whether or not you want to seek to appeal. If you do, you must file any notice of appeal within 14 days of the filing of the judgment of conviction. If you cannot afford the cost of appeal, you can apply to have those costs waived. That's called proceeding in forma pauperis, and you have a right to proceed in that manner.

I say the appeal right because you have, as every defendant has, a right to appeal. I do note, however, that you have waived your right to seek a sentence modification of any

sentence within or below the 360 months that I have now imposed.

All right. Folks, anything further?

MR. FALK: No, your Honor.

MR. COHN: Your Honor, because the proceedings discussed Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez's cooperation, we'd ask that the transcript be sealed.

THE COURT: I am going to deny the sealing because there was such a significant issue here as part of this proceeding, there has been such a significant issue in connection with whether or not the Court was giving appropriate attention to this. The duration of the sentence is significant enough. The details of the cooperation, that letter shall remain under seal. I have specifically not gone into the entire array of details. Therefore, what it means and what kind of significance it may have to anyone, I think, shall remain under seal. However, this transcript shall not. We've been quite careful.

Thank you. We're adjourned.

(Adjourned)